if you are in Germany, try opening ria.ru. It’s not like we are deprived of something worthy - it is Russian propaganda after all, but it tells enough about freedom of speech.
With the German border maybe 10 minutes to the east of me, I can open that website just fine. Seems like an exclusively German problem, not a European one.
I don't think foreign propaganda was ever exempt from freedom of speech here in Europe (except the countries and regimes which lacked free speech, of course), it just wasn't much of a problem before the internet made opinions so easy to broadcast.
Unfortunately EU is now developing practice of extrajudicial sanctions on EU and national level, targeting both media and individuals expressing points of views alternative to position of Brussels or Berlin. Vance was surprisingly right back then in Munich.
It’s not just Russian propaganda, but now it is conveniently used as a blanket cover to sanction even EU citizens (see case of German journalist Hüseyin Doğru, whose only connection to Russia was a hosting of his pro-Palestinian outlet on a platform affiliated with RT).
These are very broad generalizations and accusations based on very few individual cases, each of which has its own specific context. And "expressing points of view alternative to position of Brussels and Berlin" sounds like typical propaganda nonsense. Vance couldn't be further from truth, and his remarks sound even more ridiculous in the light of what's happening on US soil.
Do you have any specific argument about why that specific context matters and how it can justify violation of basic human rights? or it is just a dismissal with „broad generalization“?
It is much more convenient to catch the fish that eats particular sort of worms putting such worm on a hook than finding the right fish among many others in a fishnet.
This number doesn’t take into account immigration. Russian economy is supported by several millions of immigrants from Central Asia (the number much bigger than number of mobilized people). There was low unemployment before the war.
Obviously domestic investors. EU sanctions locked them on domestic market and with current macro indicators buying Russian debt is a no-brainer.
> Also how did the GDP grow by 1% in 2025, is that a function of the internal Defence spending activity?
Russia poured a lot of money in the economy, so it wasn’t just military spending. Generous payouts to families of killed and wounded soldiers did magic to local property markets. It also accelerated inflation, which pushed people to spend more. At the same time imports from the West dropped, only partially compensated by Chinese. Central bank had to raise interest rates multiple times targeting inflation and preventing economy from overheating. Now it started dropping the rates, taking into account that borrowing already suppressed and military spending is lower this year.
> "I have said many times that the Russian and Ukrainian people are one nation, in fact. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours [...] But you know we have an old parable, an old rule: wherever a Russian soldier steps, it is ours."
Also, looking at Russian track record specifically, is Georgia, which was militarily defeated in 2008, part of Russia? Did they formally annex Abkhazia or Transnistria? Does Lukashenko report to Putin?
Russia is a glimpse into the future of America if nothing changes substantially in American political system. It’s a digital surveillance state, an oligarchy which co-opted technocratic elites into a ruling class and exploits mildly oppressed population without going to extremes. It has the technology and resources to maintain status quo for a very long time and absorb moderate shocks like this war.
Except that Russia isn’t failed state. It’s politically stable (even more than before war), can mostly serve its population. The fact that it’s currently engaged in an expensive war, changes nothing.
This war has already changed. Near-stalemate on the front lines, exchange of strikes on civilian infrastructure (Ukraine made to Belgorod what Russia made to Kiev). It‘s a nuclear war without nukes, aiming at strategic defeat without advancing armies. And Russia definitely has more resources for it.
A few days ago Ukraine knocked out central heating infrastructure in Belgorod, a regional capital with 350k people, which is unlikely to be repaired until spring. Two civilians repairing it from previous strikes were killed. Whether this is rare or not, it doesn’t change anything about what I said about changing character of the war: both sides largely gave up on trying to win on the battlefield and now attack energy infrastructure of each other, putting pressure on civilian population.
When you knock out primary energy source in a large city instead of attacking military consumers, it has one goal - terror. Most people suffering from it will be civilians. There will likely be deaths. Look at the recent terrorist attack in Berlin by far left extremists: blackout of a single district resulted in at least one known direct casualty. How many people will die of hypothermia or inability to get help being locked in a high rise residential building? This is happening now in many places in Ukraine as well as in border regions of Russia. I do think it’s the same as targeting civilians directly.
>When you knock out primary energy source in a large city instead of attacking military consumers, it has one goal - terror.
Not if that city's industry is contributing to the war effort.
>Most people suffering from it will be civilians. There will likely be deaths.
You can say that about Western sanctions on Russia too. How many people have died because of a single MRI scanner or cancer drug that couldn't be bought by a Russian hospital?
Was it the "nuclear war without nukes" since the day the West imposed blanket sanctions on Russian economy?
Or did that "nuclear war without nukes" started in 2014-2015 when the Ukraine cut electricity and water supply to Crimea? "It has one goal - terror", right?
I really don’t understand your point. Are you questioning the choice of metaphor?
Ukraine cutting supply of electricity and water to Crimea did demonstrate the attitude of the Ukrainian government to people it considered once their citizen. It obviously wasn’t a part of the current chapter of the war.
Yes, there is nothing like 'nuclear war without nukes' that is happening here. And I was trying to demonstrate that your logic seem to lead to conclusion that the 'nuclear war without nukes' started in 2014.
My argument is that you can't bring strategic defeat without leveling cities or utterly destroying the power generation and electric grid. And that's not what is happening in the Ukraine or even Belgorod for that matter
In this war strategic victory is not the destruction of the state, but the control over development trajectory of the rival for the foreseeable future. Russian objective is and was not to annex entire Ukraine, but to ensure that it does not become menacing part of NATO infrastructure (they are surprisingly content with Ukraine joining EU). This is political goal and thus can be pursued through hybrid warfare, which includes psychological pressure on Ukrainian population, to ensure that current administration will loose political support and will be pressured into a peace deal on terms favorable for Russia. Ukraine does the same to achieve the opposite goal, but of course with much less success.
The whole story with territorial question is part of this: possible peace settlement could include just splitting Donbas region on the current front line, so that Putin could claim victory and Ukraine could just say they did what they could. But Russia wants more, they need Donbas in original borders, which is unacceptable to Ukraine. Why? Because if this question will be settled in the peace deal, it may open Ukraine eventually path to NATO. They want to create permanent tension the same way as it happened to Georgia, deferring the final settlement by a hundred years (see Taiwan as an example, which occupies China for decades).
>In this war strategic victory is not the destruction of the state, but the control over development trajectory of the rival for the foreseeable future.
No, it wouldn't be victory, it would be compromise. And the Ukraine isn't Russia's rival, it's just cannon fodder for the West.
>they are surprisingly content with Ukraine joining EU
Kremlin says that. Doesn't have to be true.
>which is unacceptable to Ukraine
Why is it unacceptable to the Ukraine?
I see why it's unacceptable for current regime in Kiev because they can't just say "we actually don't need Donbass, never mind hundreds of thousands lives we wasted defending it".
Russia‘s international reserves are at all time high at the moment (800B$), of which only 300B are frozen by sanctions. Doesn’t look like a sign of a death zone. The arguments for it are questionable:
>Consider the arithmetics of descent for the Kremlin. Russia’s defence sector now accounts for around 8% of GDP. Demobilising without falling into a crisis would require five conditions to be met simultaneously: credible security guarantees that satisfy the Kremlin’s threat perceptions (which in turn will determine the extent to which it rebuilds its military capabilities);
Likely result of a peace deal. Trump wants to sign it and focus on China, so some pragmatic arrangement to be expected.
> mass demobilisation with effective retraining programmes;
The easiest part. The scale of mobilization was relatively small compared to total workforce. Not sure why effective retraining sounds like a problem.
>at least partial sanctions relief for technology access;
Russia has gaps in electronics (can buy from China) and in aviation (sanctions likely to be lifted in exchange for opening transit routes). In software it is still ahead of Europe, having strong national players in AI, banking, marketplaces etc. It may need Western tech to roll out 5G, but given that they already plan it, they probably already have access to Chinese tech.
>a revolution in defence procurement that prioritises efficiency over budget absorption;
Not clear why this is relevant. The defense spending will wind down gradually, it is likely already more efficient than before the war.
> and a healthy ecosystem of small and mid-size firms capable of absorbing reallocated resources and boosting innovation.
Will likely happen as soon as tax relief will be affordable, i.e. in 1 or 2 years after the peace deal. Resilience of Russian SMEs is something developed over decades. It might happen that Dubai and South Caucasus Russian tech hubs will go home. Most importantly, there will be a huge amount of money spent on new territories similarly to infrastructure investments in Crimea, which will add few percentage of growth to GDP.
> The probability of all five converging is near zero.
This is the most interesting part of the article, but it left unexplained. Why?
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