Crimea is gone and it's not coming back. That much has been clear pretty much since day 1 of annexation. It's a strategic port, and there was a chance of a color revolution handing it to NATO. I could imagine the Kazakh cosmodrome driving a similar wedge, depending on how and if unrest grows there. Neither would imply Putin or the Russian leaders more broadly want something like "lebensraum".
In fact, Russia can't sustain an Afghanistan level war/quagmire, which is what a broader Ukrainian invasion would be. Even if they had designs beyond Abkhazia/SO style "independence movement support", I don't think they could afford (militarily, not economically) to follow through. Maybe I'm wrong and this will be like the 2nd Chechen war. I think it won't. Plenty of Western powers are already more than happy to supply "lethal aid", i.e., weapons and munitions, to Ukraine, even with neo-Nazi groups involved. The same could not be said for the Islamic fighters in Chechnya (AFAIK).
And I don't think Minsk 2 was a bluff. Neither Ukraine nor Russia are honoring it. Ukraine needs to stop implementing discriminatory language and education laws, and seriously seek to implement some form of regional autonomy. Russia needs to withdraw its forces (it was pretending it hadn't deployed any). Neither side wishes to "give in" to the other. Neither side are "the good guys", or a "beacon of democracy", or "anti-imperialists", and deserving of military support.
I wish that there had been more focus on the fact that the West could have relatively easily applied pressure to make a more serious attempt at implementing Minsk 2. But instead, everything is reduced to a battle of good and evil.
What is relevant is that the action now in Donetsk and Luhansk demonstrates that the approach of tacit acceptance taken in response to the occupation of Crimea is not (contrary to what one might assume if only looking at Abkhasia and South Ossetia as indicators) sufficient to forestall further Russian territorial aggression.
I agree, Crimea is not relevant to the discussion of whether the most likely analog is Abkhazia/SO or Munich/Danegeld. That was my point in bringing it up. It was a conditional part of your argument, but I think it was an orthogonal issue.
My other two points were that there are strong practical reasons why a full Ukrainian invasion is quite unlikely and why a full withdrawal was quite unlikely ("quagmire" and no Minsk 2 implementation, respectively).
I'm not a fan of terms like "territorial aggression", not that it's not apt (Russia invading is clearly aggression, even a meaningful threat is "aggression" according to the UN charter), but such phrases are often used as a substitute for the actual motivating factors, and hence, used as a way to obfuscate the substantive issues. I still think there is a more straightforward and practical explanation.
> And I don't think Minsk 2 was a bluff. Neither Ukraine nor Russia are honoring it. Ukraine needs to stop implementing discriminatory language and education laws, and seriously seek to implement some form of regional autonomy. Russia needs to withdraw its forces (it was pretending it hadn't deployed any).
Putin is not consumed with abstract "territorial aggression", looking at a globe with flames in his eyes (I'm not accusing you of that, I'm just having fun, and making a broader point about some of the international relations phrases that are kindof weasel words in my opinion).
Well I appear to have been implicitly quite wrong. While it’s not clear Russia will try to hold Ukraine (“quagmire”), it does appear to have launched a full invasion. Supposedly to “demilitarize” it — who knows what that will turn out to mean, but hopefully it does not involve a long term occupation. In terms of minimizing loss of life, at best we can hope for a Gulf War level annihilation and then speedy withdrawal, targeting the Ukrainian military, and mass destruction of civilian fundamental infrastructure, and worst of all, lots of civilians killed. There appear to have been many war crimes in that war, so I don’t offer it as an example of a “good war”. But I’m also not optimistic that even that example will be the maximum extent.
Biden was pushing and pushing and gave no assurance to Putin and we're here now. I'm not sure who pulls Biden's strings, but it could just be his old self when we was Obama's vice president and actually started the Euromaidan. As an US taxpayer, I'm ashamed my taxes go to support stirring of conflicts abroad with known outcomes! Just like the bombing of the sovereign Syria and the desire to separate it into two. Suddenly, what Russia is doing (and we've attempted and have done successfully in the past ourselves) is bad! Until we act the the world's bully, nobody will truly respect us, and world peace would just be a pipe dream!
In fact, Russia can't sustain an Afghanistan level war/quagmire, which is what a broader Ukrainian invasion would be. Even if they had designs beyond Abkhazia/SO style "independence movement support", I don't think they could afford (militarily, not economically) to follow through. Maybe I'm wrong and this will be like the 2nd Chechen war. I think it won't. Plenty of Western powers are already more than happy to supply "lethal aid", i.e., weapons and munitions, to Ukraine, even with neo-Nazi groups involved. The same could not be said for the Islamic fighters in Chechnya (AFAIK).
And I don't think Minsk 2 was a bluff. Neither Ukraine nor Russia are honoring it. Ukraine needs to stop implementing discriminatory language and education laws, and seriously seek to implement some form of regional autonomy. Russia needs to withdraw its forces (it was pretending it hadn't deployed any). Neither side wishes to "give in" to the other. Neither side are "the good guys", or a "beacon of democracy", or "anti-imperialists", and deserving of military support.
I wish that there had been more focus on the fact that the West could have relatively easily applied pressure to make a more serious attempt at implementing Minsk 2. But instead, everything is reduced to a battle of good and evil.