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But why?


Because security is a serious problem that needs to be treated seriously for it to be useful. You can't just sprinkle it on an existing system like fairy dust, it has to be built into the design to be effective, and it needs to be periodically re-thought mercilessly.

PGP for instance encourages some terrible habits, like awfully long lived keys.

You have somebody signing packages with an ancient DSA-1024 key, perhaps because "SQUEE Philip Zimmermann himself signed that key back in 1996 and I can't part with it". That's not the right attitude to security.

Good security requires a solution fit to whatever specific thing you need to secure, a system designed with it in mind, and a lack of sentimentality and backwards compatibility.


I completely agree with your points but you seem to be missing the point which is: why does OpenPGP's versatility make it a bad candidate?


It is not versatile - multi-purpose - it is weak - general-purpose. "Encrypt/sign these bytes with this cipher, these parameters, and this key" is the least common denominator of cryptographic ability and ignores all the work to build an actual useful cryptographic system around it.

On top of this, its specific interfaces for doing that suck, so you can't even bury it as a safe "primitive" in whatever system you're trying to build (even assuming you wanted to bring in the attack surface of a 25 year old C project).

Something like libsodium is actually versatile in that it offers primitives to build a broad set of safe tools on top of. It does more by doing less.




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