It's safer to have a new airplane design behave like the old one. There have been many crashes due a pilot being stressed and automatically doing something that would have been right on a previous airplane he was familiar with, but which was wrong for the current airplane he is flying.

All jet airliners are aerodynamically unstable and use active controls to "paper over" that. There is nothing inherently wrong with doing that.

The MCAS problem was not due to its purpose. The problem was the software for it had too much authority, and did not shut off when the pilot countermanded it. A worse problem was the pilots did not follow emergency procedures for runaway trim.

For reference, the emergency procedures are:

1. restore normal trim with the electric trim switches (which overrides MCAS)

2. turn off the trim via a switch on the console

I don't think it's worth relitigating MCAS here but your analysis here is very generous to Boeing and harsh to the pilots who where unwitting test pilots in Boeing's mistake.

In the LA crash, the crew restored normal trim 25 times, and never thought to turn off the trim. Turning off the trim is a "memory item", meaning the pilots should not need to consult a checklist for it. The switch is right there on the center console within easy reach.

The FAA sent around an Emergency Airworthiness Directive reiterating the two step process before the EA crash:

Boeing Emergency Airworthiness Directive

"Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim can be used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT."

https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA...

They also ignored the overspeed warning horn because they were apparently operating at full throttle. This was a large contributory factor to being unable to move the trim by hand.

So, yeah, it is harsh to the crews. I've also talked with MAX pilots who were quite harsh towards them. I'm amazed that one would not be harsh towards a pilot who did not bother to read/understand/remember and EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE about how not to crash.

Would you get on an airplane knowing it had such a pilot? Not me.

I assign 50% responsibility to the pilots and 50% to Boeing.

Maybe I'd buy that if the exact same thing didn't happen 5 months later with Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. Most of the blame has to be on Boeing.

The EA crew did not follow the 2 step procedure in the Emergency Airworthiness Directive given to all MAX crews before the EA crash.

Also, before the LA crash, the MCAS failure happened on the previous flight of the same aircraft, and the crew just turned off the stab trim, and continued the flight normally and landed safely. That crew was unaware of MCAS, but they followed standard runaway trim emergency procedure.

The premise that MCAS makes pilot type training unnecessary, then under some circumstances the pilot should override MCAS, is dangerously flawed.

Pilots are already trained to stop runaway trim failures, and received an Emergency Airworthiness Directive explaining trivial procedure to counter MCAS failure.

Of course, the MCAS software was badly designed, and the single path failure, are squarely Boeing's fault.

Pilots must always be ready to deal with runaway stabilizer trim, on any aircraft type. It's a "memory item".

The whole shit happened because Boeing only used only one sensor for the system because then it wouldn't be seen as safety critical and wouldn't need to be mentioned extra in the manuals

> All jet airliners are aerodynamically unstable and use active controls to "paper over" that.

This is flatly wrong. The only aerodynamically unstable planes are experimental and some fighter jets.

No passenger plane can be certified if it can't be proven that it is aerodynamically stable.

EDIT: don't take my word, here is a short explanation by a 777 pilot: https://youtu.be/EuVlbVr_jrs?feature=shared&t=129

Aerodynamic stability refers to the desire of an aircraft to return to straight and level flight without any control inputs.

Stability is also commonly understood as the opposite of maneuverability, as a more stable aircraft is less maneuverable.

Combat aircraft such as fighters are designed to be aerodynamically unstable so their maneuverability is unhindered. Likewise stunt planes and other aircraft whose job is to not fly straight and level.

Aircraft such as passenger and cargo airliners are designed to be aerodynamically stable because their job is to fly straight and level with good fuel economy and minimal piloting, they do not need swift and nimble maneuverability.

The safety of an aircraft has no relation to that aircraft's aerodynamic stability.

Airliners also have to work at low speed in thick air, and high speed in thin air. Swept wings, for example, perform poorly at lower speeds.

An airliner has to perform well at both, which is why wings are swept, yet have flaps and slats to modify their aerodynamic profile. Swept wings have other problems, like dutch roll.

Airliners also become uncontrollable above a certain speed, which was a contributing factor to the EA crash (the crew ignored the overspeed warning).

> This is flatly wrong.

Look up dutch roll, the active yaw damper that suppresses it, and the FAA requirement that all of them have a yaw damper installed.

Besides, the MAX is not unstable. All it was supposed to do was just nudge the nose down a bit to match the profile of the previous 737 jets.

>All jet airliners are aerodynamically unstable

>Besides, the MAX is not unstable.

You might want to address your seeming hypocrisy there.

MCAS was not designed to address an instability issue.

It literally killed hundreds of people by pretending to be the same plane.

This is a good tabloid take but I don't believe it's accurate. It wasn't pretending to be the same plane - it was pretending to be any aircraft with certifiable flight characteristics, particularly control forces on approach to the stall.

Indeed there is no requirement for aircraft with the same training / type certificate to handle identically. For example the whole CitationJet class from the Mustang to the CJ4.

I believe that the 737NG is not the problem aircraft. The new engines and the problematic MCAS are on the 737 MAX, a different model.

Sure I apologize, there is NG and there is "New NG" or MAX.

> there are rumors that a certain large middle eastern airline

Thank god there are airlines with standards. I'm certainly glad my Middle Eastern long haul option for a particular cross-continent journey does not have any faulty Boeing models.